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We address the heated debate over the staggered board. One theory claims that a staggered 
board facilitates entrenchment of inefficient management and thus harms corporate value. 
Consequently, some institutional investors and shareholder-rights advocates have argued 
for the elimination of the staggered board. The opposite theory is that staggered boards are 
value-enhancing since they enable the board to focus on long-term goals. Both theories are 
supported by prior and conflicting studies and theoretical law review articles. We show that 
neither theory has empirical support and, on average, a staggered board has no significant 
effect on firm value. Prior studies did not include important explanatory variables in their 
analysis or account for the changing nature of the firm over time. When we control for 
variables affecting both value and the incidence of a staggered board in a sample of up to 
2961 firms from 1990 to 2013 we find the effect of a staggered board on firm value becomes 
statistically insignificant. Notably, we find that the adoption of a staggered board, its 
retention, and its removal are not random and exogenous but rather endogenous, being 
related to firm characteristics and performance. The effect of a staggered board is 
idiosyncratic; for some firms it increases value, while for other firms it is value-destroying. 
Our results suggest caution about legal solutions that advocate wholesale adoption or repeal 
of the staggered board and instead point to an individualized firm approach. 
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Professor Lucian Bebchuk has engaged in two rounds of 
law-review-article duels with Professor Martijn Cremers 
and Professor Simone Sepe over classified boards. The 
weapons were statistics (and common sense). Cremers and 
Sepe wore the classified-board-stakeholder colors; 
Bebchuk, the agency-model-shareholder-democracy colors. 
Cremers’ and Sepe’s riposte was decisive. 
  
—Martin Lipton & Daniel Bulaevsky1 
INTRODUCTION 
The staggered board debate has been both heated and confrontational. On 
the one side are those who argue, based in part on work by Professors Lucian 
Bebchuk and Alma Cohen, that the staggered board is value-decreasing and 
entrenches directors and management.2 On the other side is the exact 
opposite argument—based in part on work by Professors Martijn Cremers, 
Lubomir Litov, and Simone Sepe—that the staggered board instead allows 
directors to bargain for higher takeover premiums and hence increases firm 
 
1 Wachtell Lipton Discusses the Classified Board Duels, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (July 6, 2017), 
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/07/06/the-classified-board-duels/ [https://perma.cc/FW9G-7DPQ]. 
2 See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409, 410 
(2005) (finding that “staggered boards are associated with an economically meaningful reduction in firm 
value”); see also Lucian Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783, 785 
(2009) (finding that increases in an index of six corporate governance features are associated with 
economically significant reductions in firm value); James M. Mahoney & Joseph T. Mahoney, An Empirical 
Investigation of the Effect of Corporate Charter Antitakeover Amendments on Stockholder Wealth, 14 STRATEGIC 
MGMT. J. 17, 26-27 (1993) (finding that antitakeover amendments have a negative effect on shareprice). 
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value.3 In recent years, this debate has devolved into polemical statements 
from both sides often (but not always) citing key empirical studies on the 
issue.4 These studies and this debate have driven recent law review policy 
proposals calling for either banning the staggered board or making the 
staggered board mandatory for all companies.5 Studies finding negative 
wealth effects of a staggered board have also undergirded a campaign by the 
Harvard Law School Shareholder Rights Project to push publicly traded 
companies in the S&P 500 to eliminate their staggered boards.6 
This Article sorts through this debate, gives clarity to the policy arguments, 
and provides an assessment of these empirical studies. We do so by analyzing 
the empirical and theoretical issues with studies both supporting and 
disparaging the staggered board. We then conduct our own empirical analysis 
of prior studies to determine their validity. We show that contrary to the prior 
major studies, a staggered board has no significant effect on firm value. 
We begin by theorizing that prior studies are not robust to different estimation 
models. Specifically, when a regression is performed, explanatory variables are 
included to identify their effect on the dependent variable. For example, consider 
a study to ascertain the effect of irrigation on plant growth. Plant growth would 
 
3 See K. J. Martijn J. Cremers et al., Staggered Boards and Long-Term Firm Value, Revisited, 126 J. 
FIN. ECON. 422, 424 (2017) (suggesting “staggered boards could contribute to firm value by 
preventing inefficient takeovers and/or serving to bond a firm’s commitment to the firm’s long-term 
stakeholders”); see also Thomas Bates et al., Board Classification and Managerial Entrenchment: 
Evidence from the Market for Corporate Control, 87 J. FIN. ECON. 656, 658 (2008) (finding that a 
staggered board reduces the likelihood of receiving a takeover bid, though the economic effect is 
marginal); Martijn Cremers & Alan Ferrell, Thirty Years of Shareholder Rights and Firm Value, 69 J. 
FIN. 1167, 1168 (2014) (finding that a staggered board is associated with higher firm value); David F. 
Larcker et al., The Market Reaction to Corporate Governance Regulation, 101 J. FIN. ECON. 431, 448 
(2011) (suggesting that “a staggered board is a value-maximizing governance choice”). 
4 For an overview of the controversy, see Brian Baxter, Spat over Staggered Boards Pits Wachtell 
Against Harvard’s Bebchuk, AM. LAW DAILY (Mar. 21, 2012), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/
amlawdaily/2012/03/wachtell-harvard-shareholder.html [https://perma.cc/5HQ7-A9GY]. It has also 
led to allegations of illegality. See Daniel M. Gallagher & Joseph A. Grundfest, Did Harvard Violate 
Federal Securities Law? The Campaign Against Classified Boards of Directors 5-6 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. 
Governance at Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 199, 2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2536586 
[https://perma.cc/F467-PUT3]; see also infra note 36 and accompanying text. 
5 Compare, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1686 (2013) (overviewing “the long-time persistence and robustness of the 
documented association between stronger board insulation and poorer firm performance”), with, e.g., 
K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, The Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards, 68 STAN. L. 
REV. 67, 75 (2016) (“[W]e recommend legal reform that would transform staggered boards into a 
quasi-mandatory rule.”). They have also lead to proposals outside this dichotomy. See, e.g., Martin 
Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of 
Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187 (1991) (advocating five-year terms for corporate directors). 
6 To learn more about the Project, see SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PROJECT, 
http://www.srp.law.harvard.edu/index.shtml [https://perma.cc/94G9-XUC5]. For an analysis of the 
Project’s effects, see K. J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, Board Declassification Activism 5-6 (June 
2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2962162 [https://perma.cc/ZXK6-JBAB]. 
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be our dependent variable and irrigation an explanatory variable, along with other 
variables that affect plant growth such as fertilization, cultivation and weather 
conditions. The goal would be to isolate the effect of irrigation by considering all 
the relevant factors that make plants grow, because farmers who are careful about 
irrigation also diligently fertilize and cultivate the plants. Omitting these variables 
may incorrectly attribute their effects on plant growth to irrigation alone. 
In the case of the staggered board, the dependent variable is the firm’s 
market value (relative to its assets), and the main explanatory variable is the 
presence or absence of a staggered board, controlling for other firm 
characteristics that affect value. To obtain a good assessment of the 
relationship of firm value and the staggered board, it is important to include 
the main variables that effect the presence or absence of a staggered board to 
tease out the full relationship between the variables. 
We show that prior studies, including the study by Professors Bebchuk and 
Cohen, do not include important explanatory variables that affect firm value and 
are correlated with the presence or absence of a staggered board.7 The result is that 
these studies have inappropriately attributed a lower firm value to the presence of 
the staggered board instead of to these omitted variables. To illustrate with 
another example, while the birth of baby lambs is positively correlated with the 
arrival of storks, it is not that storks bring baby lambs. Rather, both are positively 
affected by the spring weather that causes the arrival of both. If we omit the spring 
weather from a model we may infer erroneously from the lambs–storks correlation 
that the former is affected by the latter. In the case of the staggered board, once 
we include our identified, omitted variables—firm characteristics—there is no 
longer a significant relation between a staggered board and firm value. 
We make this finding by first estimating the effect of a staggered board on 
firm value across firms and over time, employing the explanatory variables used 
in prior studies. Using data compiled by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) 
and its predecessors, we examine the effect of a staggered board on up to 2961 
firms over a timespan of twenty-three years for a total of up to 27,016 firm-years.8 
Our initial results show that firm value is negatively affected by a staggered 
board, which is consistent with the prominent study of Bebchuk and Cohen.9 
This is notable since the Bebchuk and Cohen study ended in 2002; we extend 
it through 2013 with a similar result. However, the effect of a staggered board 
 
7 See discussion infra subsection II.B.1. 
8 In some of our models, data limitations force us to use a dataset of 1959 firms over a time span 
of twenty-one years for a total of 15,921 firm-years. Additionally, and consistent with the findings of 
Professors Larcker, Reiss, and Xiao, we find that there are significant coding errors in this database. 
See infra notes 49–50 and accompanying text; cf. David F. Larcker et al., Corporate Governance Data 
and Measures Revisited 4-8 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance at Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 
211, 2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2694802 [https://perma.cc/A2MP-FQLX]. 
9 See Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 2, at 410. 
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becomes insignificant once related explanatory variables are included in our 
analysis. Putting this result another way, Bebchuk and Cohen’s analysis does 
not include important variables related to both firm value and the incidence of 
the firm having a staggered board. The inclusion of these variables renders the 
effect of a staggered board on firm value insignificant. In particular, we find 
that the negative firm value–staggered board relation becomes insignificant 
once we include in the model an entrenchment index developed by Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Ferrell that quantifies other corporate governance measures.10 This 
leads to the conclusion that the firm-value effects of a staggered board are 
driven by other variables and not by the staggered board itself. 
We next turn to studies that have shown that the staggered board 
enhances value, examining the most prominent study in this area, that of 
Cremers, Litov, and Sepe.11 Their empirical strategy was to add firm-fixed 
effects to the models of Bebchuk and Cohen. These effects control for 
unobserved individual firm characteristics that are time invariant and 
purportedly account for the idiosyncratic nature of the firm, thus attempting 
to address the omitted variable problem of the Bebchuk and Cohen study. 
We replicate the Cremers, Litov, and Sepe methodology and find similar 
results. However, given that our sample spans twenty-three years (1991–2013) 
and firm-fixed effects are by definition constant over this period, it is unlikely 
that all firms have invariable characteristics over this long period of time. 
Rather, we know that some firms choose to stagger their boards and other firms 
decide to destagger their boards. It is likely that these decisions are undertaken 
because for some firms there are changes in unobserved characteristics and 
conditions over time. We therefore split the sample into two subperiods and 
estimate the model for each subperiod. When we make this adjustment to 
account for the varying effect of firm-fixed effects, we find that a staggered 
board has no significant effect on firm value in any of the two subperiods. 
Our results thus find shortcomings in both sides of the debate. They also 
highlight the sensitivity of any analysis of the staggered board and firm value 
to the choice of variables and models. To the extent that variable selection 
produces such different results, it highlights the unreliability of prior studies 
concerning the wealth effects of staggered boards. 
We also address the fact that having a staggered board—its adoption, 
retention, or removal—is a result of a decision made by the firm. In other words, 
the estimated effect of a staggered board may reflect the consequences of the 
 
10 This index was first proposed in Bebchuk et al., supra note 2. The provisions included in the 
index are limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority 
requirements for mergers and charter amendments. The original index also includes the staggered 
board, which we of course omit from the index and include as a separate variable. Cf. id. at 784-85. 
11 See Cremers et al., supra note 3. 
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factors that led to the decision rather than resulting from the presence or absence 
of a staggered board. We correct for this problem by employing an instrumental 
variable estimation method, which is detailed in subsection II.B.4. In this 
analysis, we find the value effect of a staggered board becomes insignificant. 
We conclude by examining the policy implications of our findings. Our 
analysis means no definitive conclusion can be made at this time as to the positive 
or negative wealth effects of a staggered board. In terms of wholesale policy 
efforts to adopt or repeal staggered boards, our results suggest caution. We find 
that staggered boards appear to be affected by firm characteristics that account 
for decisions on adoption, retention, and removal of the staggered board 
provision, which are partially unobserved or cannot be quantified for the purpose 
of research. Our findings ultimately highlight the theoretical proposition that the 
staggered board is endogenous, and that the decision to adopt (or not) the 
staggered board is unique to each firm and its characteristics.12 In some firms the 
staggered board may be value-enhancing, in others value-destroying. Therefore, 
the battle over the staggered board must be waged at the individual firm level. 
More generally, our results provide evidence for measured skepticism of prior 
corporate governance studies and their implications for the structure of the board 
of directors generally. We conclude by analyzing various legal proposals related 
to the staggered board, and find that our results suggest caution about each of 
them. The rhetoric unfortunately does not match reality and the staggered board 
is neither value-decreasing nor value-enhancing overall. Instead, it appears a 
firm-specific approach should be adopted for the staggered board. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Theoretical Effect of the Staggered Board 
The staggered board, sometimes called a classified board, is a mechanism 
which allows a board of directors to be elected to staggered terms, typically over 
three years, rather than annually.13 In a staggered board, one-third of directors 
are elected in any given year, meaning it takes two years to replace a majority of 
the directors. The staggered board can thus make a hostile takeover significantly 
more difficult due to the existence of a shareholder-rights plan, colloquially 
known as a poison pill. A poison pill prevents a hostile bid from succeeding 
unless the hostile bidder replaces a majority of a target’s directors in order to 
have the new directors remove the poison pill and allow the hostile bid to 
 
12 In subsection II.B.4 we explore the problem of endogeneity in our model and describe how 
we resolve it. 
13 For a statutory explanation, see, for example, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(d) (2016). 
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proceed.14 But a staggered board requires that a hostile bidder run proxy contests 
over two annual stockholder meetings to replace a majority of the board. The 
time and cost of such an uncertain endeavor can deter a hostile bidder.15 
Over 50 years ago Henry Manne theorized that the market for corporate 
control served as a disciplining force for managers.16 Thus an unconstrained 
takeover market would ensure that companies are run more efficiently. This 
theoretical idea has served as the premise for the studies which have found the 
staggered board to be value-decreasing. By protecting management from 
removal, the staggered board entrenches poorly performing management and 
firm inefficiencies.17 Thus, opponents of the staggered board rely on Manne’s 
theory and studies of staggered boards to oppose antitakeover defenses generally. 
In this regard, the staggered board together with the poison pill is considered one 
of the most powerful takeover defenses a U.S. company can have.18 
While those who favor a free market for corporate control oppose the 
staggered board, the opposite view has been taken by those who believe that 
firms should be allowed to defend themselves against hostile takeovers and that 
the decision to sell the company should remain with the board of directors. 
These arguments have been put forth most vigorously by Marty Lipton, the 
inventor of the poison pill.19 He and other proponents claim that a staggered 
board helps firms maintain stability and continuity within the board and enables 
management to pursue long-term strategic plans.20 Absent a staggered board 
such plans could be frustrated by a hostile offer or could make management forgo 
value-increasing long-term projects that appear unprofitable in the short-term.21 
 
14 See Steven M. Davidoff, A Case Study: Air Products v. Airgas and the Value of Strategic Judicial 
Decision-Making, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 502, 508. 
15 See Bates et al., supra note 3, at 657; see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful 
Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 925-39 
(2002) (finding “strong empirical support” that “staggered boards are the most powerful antitakeover 
device in the current arsenal of takeover defense weapons”). 
16 See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for the Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112 (1965). 
17 See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 5, at 1638-39; see also Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey 
of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 746-48 (1997) (outlining the fundamental issues in corporate 
governance stemming from the agency problem caused by the separation of ownership from control). 
18 See also supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
19 See Martin Lipton, Pills, Polls, and Professors Redux, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1039 (2002) (“I have 
sought to preserve the ability of the board of directors of a target of a hostile takeover bid to control the 
target’s destiny and, on a properly informed basis, to conclude that the corporation remain independent.”). 
20 See, e.g., Mark Gordon, Takeover Defenses Work. Is That Such a Bad Thing?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
819, 837 (2002) (arguing that staggered boards “ensure that the balance of bargaining power between 
acquirors and targets does not ebb and flow based solely on the timing of the target’s annual meeting”). 
21 Proponents of this theory often claim that these issues will arise because of misinformed or 
misguided shareholders who, without the restraints offered by the staggered board, would push management 
to undertake action which is not value-maximizing. This problem has been highlighted by Professors Goshen 
and Squire who describe it as a “principal-cost problem.” See Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal 
Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 770 (2017) (“When investors 
exercise control, they make mistakes due to a lack of expertise, information, or talent . . . .”). 
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A staggered board thus provides more latitude to a board of directors to 
manage the firm towards long-term goals. A staggered board can also 
strengthen managers’ bargaining power against hostile bidders, enabling the 
extraction of better terms for the target firm, and also potentially benefiting 
stockholders by enabling the target firm to better evaluate competing bids.22 
Finally, board members who serve for a longer period of time have more power 
to oversee the firm and discipline the firm’s chief executive officer, another 
factor that potentially increases firm value. Consistent with this contrasting 
theory, the adoption of a staggered board should be found to increase value. 
The theoretical underpinnings of the staggered board are subject to 
empirical testing. More specifically, if the staggered board is entrenching 
poorly performing management or otherwise deleterious to the firm, its 
adoption should decrease firm value. Conversely, if a staggered board is 
beneficial to a firm by permitting management to undertake more long-term 
value-enhancing projects or other beneficial measures, the adoption of a 
staggered board should be found to increase value. 
The primary set of studies on the effect of the staggered board have 
examined staggered board adoptions or rejections over time.23 The most 
prominent and important study in this group is by Professors Bebchuk and 
Cohen. The authors found that a staggered board decreased firm value by 
 
22 See Richard H. Koppes et al., Corporate Governance Out of Focus: The Debate Over Classified 
Boards, 54 BUS. LAW. 1023, 1051 (1999) (noting the “increased negotiating power in takeover situations 
that results from a [staggered] board”); Martin Lipton & Theodore Mirvis, Harvard’s Shareholder 
Rights Project is Wrong, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 23, 2012), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/03/23/harvards-shareholder-rights-project-is-wrong/ [https://
perma.cc/QS2N-HWV9](“[I]t is our experience that the absence of a staggered board makes it 
significantly harder for a public company to fend off an inadequate, opportunistic takeover bid, and 
is harmful to companies that focus on long-term value creation.”). See generally Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can 
We Do Better by Ordinary Investors?: A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of 
Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (2014) (offering a critique of Professor Bebchuk’s belief that 
corporations should be direct democracies responsive to shareholder preferences as opposed to the 
board being insulated and thus possibly better at focusing on the long-term). 
23 The first set of studies exploring the wealth effects of staggered boards analyzed stockprice 
movements around the time of the staggered board adoption or rejection. These studies attempted to 
measure the wealth effects of the staggered board through stockprice reactions by examining the excess 
returns on company stock surrounding the time of adoption or rejection of a staggered board. The results 
in these studies were mixed. See, e.g., Re-Jin Guo et al., Undoing the Powerful Anti-Takeover Force of Staggered 
Boards, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 274, 283 (2008) (finding “clear evidence that dismantling staggered boards is 
beneficial to shareholders”); George A. Jarrell & Annette B. Poulsen, Shark Repellents and Stock Prices: The 
Effects of Antitakeover Amendments Since 1980, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 127, 141-44 (1987) (finding the effect of a 
staggered board is statistically weak and that abnormal returns around the time of staggered board 
announcements are insignificant); Mahoney & Mahoney, supra note 2, at 26 (finding “more recent 
staggered board amendments (since 1980) have had significantly negative impacts on shareholder wealth”). 
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roughly 17%, as measured by the ratio of the firm’s market value to its book 
value of assets, a measure of firm value known as Tobin’s Q.24 
Professors Bates, Becher, and Lemmon cast doubt on Bebchuk and 
Cohen’s finding of such a large value effect of a staggered board associated 
with the ease of takeover. They find that the effects of hostile bids on target 
firm value are similar for firms with and without classified boards.25 They also 
find that a bidder’s stockprice reaction at the time of bid announcement is 
2.7% lower if the target firm has a staggered board.26 And, as they put it, 
“These results are not consistent with the notion that classification, on 
average, facilitates self-dealing by incumbent managers at the expense of 
target shareholders. Instead, the findings indicate that, consistent with the 
shareholder interest hypothesis, bidders fare worse when negotiating takeover 
bids with targets with a classified board structure.”27 
However, the same study did find that “eliminating the deterrence effect 
associated with board classification increases the implied value of firms by only 
1.1%.”28 Though smaller than Bebchuk and Cohen’s estimate of a staggered board’s 
effect on firm value, it is hard to translate this increase to the effects on value 
ceteris paribus since Bebchuk and Cohen do not report the means and medians 
of the firms’ market to book values in their analysis, a necessary predicate to such 
calculation. However, assuming for simplicity that the median Tobin’s Q for the 
economy is 1, it means that the negative effect of staggered board on firm value 
as estimated by Bebchuk and Cohen is between six and sixteen times greater than 
that estimated by Bates, Becher, and Lemmon. One conclusion from this analysis 
is that the large negative effect of a staggered board on firm value documented 
by Bebchuk and Cohen can hardly be accounted for by the fact that a staggered 
board impedes the replacement of inefficient management. 
 
24 See Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 2, at 427 tbl.4. The Tobin’s Q figures in the analysis were 
adjusted for the industry median. Id. And notably, the authors present evidence that a staggered 
board placed in the corporate charter is determinative of value while a bylaws-based staggered board 
does not have a statistically significant value. In the latter case, the authors find that there is no 
lower value effect, a circumstance likely attributable to the fact that shareholders can unilaterally 
amend a bylaw to remove a staggered board. Id. at 428-30. 
For other studies echoing Bebchuk and Cohen’s conclusions, see, for example, Olubunmi Faleye, Classified 
Boards, Firm Value, and Managerial Entrenchment, 83 J. FIN. ECON. 501, 507 (2007), which found “classified 
boards are associated with an 18.15 percentage point reduction in firm value as measured by Tobin’s q.” 
For a critique of the use of Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm value, and a proposal for alternate operating 
efficiency measurements, see generally Robert Batlett & Frank Partnoy, The Misuse of Tobin’s Q (Feb. 4, 
2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3118020 [https://perma.cc/5NQB-QT5E], and 
Philip H. Dybvig & Mitch Warachka, Tobin’s q Does Not Measure Firm Performance (March 5, 2015) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1562444 [https://perma.cc/Y7Z5-X6YZ]. 
25 Bates et al., supra note 3, at 669. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 674. 
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A prominent recent study by Cremers, Litov, and Sepe attempts to 
reexamine the value effect of a staggered board. The authors highlight the 
omitted variable problem of the Bebchuk–Cohen study and attempt to address 
it by including firm-fixed effects in their regressions, thus identifying the 
effects of staggering and destaggering on firm values over time, holding the 
firms’ unobserved characteristics constant.29 In a matched sample study of 
3076 firms from 1978–2015, the authors found staggering increases Tobin’s Q 
while destaggering decreases it.30 They find that there is a positive (negative) 
relation between the adoption (deletion) of a staggered board and firm value. 
In sum, the evidence on the value of staggered boards is mixed. Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and others have found a staggered board has a wealth-decreasing 
effect; Cremers, Litov, Sepe, and others have found a staggered board has a 
wealth-increasing effect. The differences between the studies is attributable 
to the different methods they employ to account for omitted variables, a topic 
we take up below. 
B. The Policy Dispute 
The contrasting empirical research on staggered boards has produced 
differing policy prescriptions, markedly affecting the governance of corporate 
America. Based on the theoretical and empirical findings against staggered 
boards, a number of academics have proposed policies to disfavor staggered 
board adoption by public companies. Among the most prominent in this 
camp is Professor Lucian Bebchuk,31 who started the Shareholder Rights 
Project at Harvard Law School to put this position into reality by 
representing institutional shareholders in asking firms to repeal their 
 
29 Cremers et al., supra note 3, at 424. 
30 Id. at 434. These results naturally depend on the quality of the match between firms subject 
to the change in staggered board and those serving as control firms. But these results have been 
echoed by other studies. See, e.g., Cremers & Ferrell, supra note 3, at 1187-88 (finding a staggered 
board is associated with higher firm value); Cremers & Sepe, supra note 5, at 72 (“Adopting a 
staggered board . . . is associated with a statistically and economically significant increase in firm 
value, while decisions to destagger a board . . . are associated with a corresponding reduction in firm 
value.”); Weili Ge et al., What Are The Consequences of Board Destaggering? 24 (Mar. 29, 2016) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2312565 [https://perma.cc/W5Wv-JRQX] 
(finding “that destaggering does not result in improved firm value . . . our evidence is more 
consistent with the view that the destaggering of boards eventually leads to reduced firm financial 
performance”); see also Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? 
Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 111 (2001) (analyzing 310 firms at the IPO 
stage and concluding a staggered board is not correlated with value-maximizing principles); Larcker 
et al., supra note 3, at 443-45 (finding firms with staggered boards experience negative excess returns 
when legislation is proposed to prevent using staggered boards). 
31 See Bebchuk, supra note 5, at 1687 (“Policymakers and institutional investors should, going 
forward, reject the arguments for limiting the rights and involvement of shareholders that are 
regularly made in the name of long-term value.”). 
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staggered board. The Project was very successful: it targeted 129 companies in the 
S&P 500; 121 subsequently destaggered and eliminated their staggered board.32 
Not surprisingly, proponents of the staggered board have vigorously objected 
to the Harvard Shareholder Rights Project. The law firm Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen 
& Katz has opposed this project in the belief that it “exacerbate[s] the short-term 
pressures under which American companies are forced to operate.”33 In a memo to 
clients outlining its opposition, the firm stated that “it is our experience that the 
absence of a staggered board . . . is harmful to companies that focus on long-term 
value creation.”34 For his part, Bebchuk has argued that the firm’s premise is faulty 
since “[c]ontrary to what insulation advocates commonly presume, the existence 
of inefficient capital markets and short investor horizons does not imply that the 
long-term effects of board insulation are positive overall.”35 But separately, 
Professor Joe Grundfest and then–SEC commissioner Daniel Gallagher wrote an 
article titled Did Harvard Violate Federal Securities Law? The Campaign Against 
Classified Boards of Directors arguing that the Harvard Rights Project violated 
federal securities laws since the Project failed to cite the countervailing empirical 
evidence in its shareholder proposals to repeal the staggered board.36 
The research on the beneficial effect of staggered boards has also produced law 
review proposals encouraging staggered board adoptions. In this vein, Cremers 
and Sepe—who find that the staggered board is value-enhancing—propose the 
adoption of a “quasi-mandatory” rule for staggered boards.37 A public 
company board would have exclusive authority to opt out of this rule by 
proposing a staggered board waiver, but contrary to current law, the 
shareholders of the company could not do so.38 Cremers and Sepe 
concomitantly propose that Rule 14a-8 under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 be amended to preclude shareholder-initiated staggered board 
proposals.39 Even if the board endorsed a staggered board opt-out, it would 
require approval of a supermajority of two-thirds of the company’s shares.40 
The authors state that this is a quasi-mandatory rule that: 
 
32 For an overview of the Project’s accomplishments, see generally Lucian Bebchuk et al., 
Towards the Declassification of S&P 500 Boards, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 157 (2013). 
33 Memorandum from Martin Lipton et al. 1 (Mar. 21, 2012), http://wlrk.com/webdocs/
wlrknew/WLRKMemos/WLRK/WLRK.21664.12.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7AG-VX9T]. 
34 Id. 
35 Bebchuk, supra note 5, at 1642. 
36 See Gallagher & Grundfest, supra note 4, at 64 (arguing the Project’s proposal violated Rule 14a-9 of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which prohibits materially false and misleading shareholder proposals). 
37 Cremers & Sepe, supra note 5, at 138. Cremers and Sepe base this proposal on research by 
Professors Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner on the effect of penalty default rules and their role in 
personal choice. Id. at 138-39. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 139. 
40 Id. 
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[w]ould substantially reduce the leverage that activist shareholders currently 
have against boards and, in turn, the risk of coerced board approval to destagger. 
In its strongest version, this proposal would also involve rolling back majority 
voting standards by mandating the adoption of plurality voting standards. This 
additional reform would eliminate the ability of shareholders to use withhold 
campaigns to induce a corporation’s directors to dismantle a staggered board.41 
Cremers and Sepe argue that their value effects are caused by shareholders who 
are short-termist in nature and thus do not support long-term efforts by the board 
to create shareholder value in firms without a staggered board. The two state “that 
the promotion of long-term specific investments and the related need to ensure 
optimal stakeholder investments are the primary channels through which a 
staggered board increases firm value.”42 In this vein the authors do not adopt a per 
se mandatory rule because of the appearance of socially beneficial bargaining. They 
state that “it is still possible that there will be a subset of companies for which 
destaggering could pass a social cost–benefit threshold. For example, liquidity 
needs could persuade directors to accept the requests of prospective investors to 
destagger the board in exchange for the injection of much-needed capital.”43 
The staggered board debate reached a boil when Professors Cremers and 
Sepe posted Board Declassification Activism: The Financial Value of the 
Shareholder Rights Project, a draft article analyzing the effect on firm value of 
board destaggering because of the Harvard Rights Project between 2012–2014 
and comparing the results to cases of board destaggering without the Project. 
The authors argue that based on their findings “board declassification in 
[Project] targets is associated with a statistically significant reduction in firm 
value.”44 Professors Bebchuk and Cohen quickly replied, arguing that 
on a close reading, the results of [Cremers and Sepe] fail to provide support 
for opposing declassifications. When these results are appropriately 
interpreted, they provide some significant evidence that declassifications are 
beneficial and no evidence that declassifications are value-reducing. 
Furthermore, the results presented in the authors’ prior published work 
relating to preceding years do not hold, and indeed are substantially reversed, 
for the period considered by their current study. On the whole, the results of 
the current study undermine the authors’ prior recommendations in support 
of staggered boards.45 
 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 140. 
43 Id. 
44 Cremers & Sepe, supra note 6, at 5. 
45 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Recent Board Declassifications 1 (May 22, 2017) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2970629 [https://perma.cc/NQL7-BTZG]. 
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The net result is that diametrically opposed policy proposals are being put 
forth which are based on diametrically opposed empirical research. The 
debate over the staggered board has thus become one of conflicting views in 
different studies. We aim to sort through this evidence. 
C. Our Empirical Strategy 
We posit that prior studies on the long-term value effect of staggered 
boards suffer from the omitted variable problem we highlighted above. In 
order to address this issue, we replicate the Bebchuk and Cohen study but 
add in additional variables which might be associated with the adoption or 
deletion of the staggered board and at the same time directly affect firm value. 
Our goal is to determine if it is the staggered board that is affecting firm value 
in the analysis or other variables which might engender a firm to adopt or retain 
a staggered board that are affecting the outcome. For example, it may be that a 
firm with poor return on assets is more likely to adopt a staggered board to 
prevent a takeover of the firm at a low price and thus enable it to improve its poor 
performance. In such a case it is not the staggered board which is value-reducing 
but the fact that the firm has suffered a poor return on assets. The staggered 
board in this scenario is only a symptom. By adding additional variables we can 
better determine the attributes driving a staggered board adoption. 
Second, we analyze the effect of a staggered board on firm value when the 
estimation employs firm-fixed effects. Cremers, Litov, and Sepe adopt this 
approach to address the omitted variable problem.46 By using fixed effects the 
authors account for the unobserved features of the firm that remain constant 
over time (or that change very slowly) whose effect also remains constant over 
time. By doing so they allow the effect of the staggered board to be isolated. 
However, it is possible that fixed effects change over time. In order to address 
this issue we replicate the Cremers, Litov, and Sepe study but divide the 
analysis into two periods. This allows us to measure the effect of firm-fixed 
effects over a more discrete period of time to see if changing characteristics of 
the firm are responsible for the value changes Cremers, Litov, and Sepe find. 
II. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
A. Dataset 
Our dataset is the same as the one used by Bebchuk and Cohen, expanded 
to include later years. We use the data compiled by the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) during the period 1995 to 2006. The 
 
46 See Cremers et al., supra note 3. 
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IRRC data were available for 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 
2006. After 2005, the database changed its name to RiskMetrics, and then 
ISS, and in 2007 began publishing annual data. From 1990–2006, we follow 
Professors Bebchuk, Cohen, Ferrell, Gompers, Ishii, Metrick, and others by 
assuming a firm’s governance provisions as reported in a given IRRC volume 
remained in place during the period following the publication of the volume 
until the publication of the subsequent volume.47 
The dataset we utilize includes up to 2961 firms over a timespan of 
between twenty-one and twenty-three years that ends in 2013 for a total of 
up to 27,016 firm-years, depending on the model employed.48 As observed by 
Professors Larcker, Reiss, and Xiao, we too find coding errors in the ISS 
database.49 We correct by hand any errors we find regarding the staggered 
board status of firms. Our corrections constitute approximately 0.5% of 
staggered board observations.50 Our analysis is conducted with the corrected 
dataset. In unreported results, we also run each analysis on the uncorrected 
dataset and find no significant difference in our results. For stockprices we 
use the Center for Research in Security Prices database; for accounting 
information we use the COMPUSTAT database; for acquisition data we use 
Thomson SDC. For institutional holdings we use the Thomson 13F database 
and for insider holdings we use S&P’s ExecuComp database. 
We exclude from our dataset real estate investment trusts and firms with 
dual-class shares.51 In addition, we trim the sample in each year by deleting 
firms that have the highest and lowest 1% of the distribution of lagged size 
(market capitalization). Microsize firms are nonconsequential, and very large 
firms are less likely to become takeover targets. We delete an entire industry 
if all firms in that industry either have a staggered board or do not have a 
staggered board.52 We also code all firms incorporated in the state of 
Massachusetts as having a staggered board given that this state adopted a 
staggered board statute in 1990 and even in firms that opted out of the 
 
47 Cf., e.g., Bebchuk et al., supra note 2, at 796; Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and 
Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107, 113 (2003). 
48 We begin with a larger dataset. The remaining data are after we employ filters which are 
detailed in the text. 
49 See Larcker et al., supra note 8, at 4-8. 
50 More specifically, our strategy to doublecheck the IRCC database is to recode by hand any 
company who has switched the staggered board at least three times (e.g., adopting a staggered board, 
dropping it, and adopting it again, or the other way around). But since we do not recreate the entire 
database by hand, we cannot be certain that our corrections are comprehensive. 
51 This is consistent with Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 2, at 418. 
52 This is done because we use industry-fixed effects in our models so these observations do 
not contribute towards the identification of the coefficient of the staggered board variable. 
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requirement, management can readopt it at will, meaning every 
Massachusetts company has a latent staggered board.53 
B. Examining the Effect of a Staggered Board on Firm Value 
1. The Staggered Board and Omitted Variables 
We begin by examining the characteristics of our sample.54 Among the 
firm-years in the sample, nearly 60% have a staggered board. We also find 
that the median firm age in our sample is twenty-two years, meaning that 
there is a significant number of companies which have survived over an 
extended period of time. Consistent with other studies, approximately 59% 
of the firms in our sample are Delaware firms. 
In Table 1 we turn to estimation of the determinants of the firms’ Tobin’s 
Q, the measurement we use for firm value. The first set of estimations is 
pooled ordinary least squares regressions.55 Columns 1 and 2 include only the 
variables used by Bebchuk and Cohen.56 We refer to these columns as the 
Bebchuk–Cohen Model. Columns 3 and 4 include additional variables which 
theoretically may affect firm value but are absent in the Bebchuk–Cohen 
model.57 We refer to these columns as the Additional Variables model.58 The 
dependent variable is logQ, the logarithmic value of Tobin’s Q, which enables 
us to determine the effect of various firm characteristics—including the 
presence or absence of a staggered board—on firm value.59 
 
53 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156D, § 8.06 (2017). 
54 Table 5 (in the Appendix) presents descriptive statistics for the variables we employ. 
55 All estimated models include year- and industry-fixed effects, using two-digit SIC codes. Thus 
the estimation reflects differences between firms with different characteristics within a given industry. 
The tests of statistical significance employ standard errors that are clustered by firms. This is because 
the same firms appear multiple times in the regression and thus the unexplained residuals for each firm 
over some years may not be independent. For example, if a firm has an unobserved characteristic that 
makes its value deviate from that which is predicted by the model, the residual values for the firm over 
the years will not be independent. The clustering procedure accounts for this and, consequently, affects 
the statistical significance of the results. The estimated standard errors that we use are also robust to 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation using the robust Huber–White sandwich estimator. 
56 Column 1 excludes the variable stockholding by insiders (Insider Ownership) since the inclusion 
of this variable greatly reduces the number of firm-years with available data. Because data on insider 
ownership began only in 1992 whereas the sample begins in 1990, including Insider Ownership moves 
the starting year of our sample from 1991 to 1993 since we lag all explanatory variables by one year. 
57 Column 4 includes stockholding by both insiders (Insider Ownership) and institutions 
(Institutional Holdings), which reduces the sample size compared to column 3. 
58 The Additional Variables model includes more variables than the Bebchuk–Cohen Model 
and has fewer firm-years (11% fewer observations in column 3 compared to column 1 and 24% fewer 
observations in column 4 versus column 2). 
59 The regression model fits the data much better with logQ compared to Q, which was the dependent 
variable in Bebchuk and Cohen’s analysis. This means that the effect of the explanatory variables on Q is 
nonlinear. Using logQ is consistent with the approach of other researchers who study firm value. See, e.g., 
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Table 1: The Effect on Firm Value of a Staggered 
Board, Controlling for Other Variables60 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Staggered Board 
-0.023** -0.025** -0.015 -0.015 
(-2.110) (-2.292) (-1.457) (-1.302) 
Log(Total Assets) 
-0.021*** -0.018*** -0.085*** -0.106*** 
(-4.697) (-3.655) (-9.595) (-10.197) 
Log(Age) 
-0.012 -0.010 -0.021*** -0.017** 
(-1.490) (-1.117) (-2.760) (-2.017) 
Delaware 
0.023* 0.022* 0.027** 0.029** 
(1.908) (1.797) (2.278) (2.236) 
Return on Assets 
1.899*** 2.044*** 1.602*** 1.689*** 
(20.674) (20.049) (15.085) (13.065) 
Capital Expenditures 
-0.131 -0.267** 0.014 -0.239** 
(-1.280) (-2.287) (0.156) (-2.119) 
R&D 
0.311*** 0.440*** 0.311*** 0.409*** 
(7.262) (8.637) (7.987) (7.913) 
R&D Missing 
-0.116*** -0.108*** -0.071*** -0.061*** 




















Liquid Assets 0.143*** 0.129** 
 
Zvi Griliches, Market Value, R&D, and Patents, 7 ECON. LETTERS 183, 184 (1981); Philipp G. Sandner & 
Joern Block, The Market Value of R&D, Patents, and Trademarks, 40 RES. POL’Y 969, 972 (2011). 
60 The dependent variable is logQ, where Q is the ratio of the firm’s market value to book value 
of assets. The standard errors are clustered by firm. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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(3.083) (2.494) 










N 27,016 21,806 23,962 16,599 
Firms 2961 2456 2593 2006 
R2 0.408 0.442 0.435 0.479 
 
The result across all four columns is that a staggered board has a negative effect 
on firm value, consistent with the findings of Bebchuk and Cohen.61 However, the 
effect of a staggered board is statistically insignificant in the Additional Variables 
model. The effect of a staggered board is statistically significant only in columns 1 
and 2, which employ Bebchuk and Cohen’s variables. In columns 3 and 4, which 
include our additional explanatory variables, the coefficients of Staggered Board are 
less negative and are not statistically significant. The test statistics imply that even 
if there is no relationship between a staggered board and logQ, there is a chance of 
between 1/7 and 1/5 (for columns 3 and 4, respectively) that we erroneously find 
such a relationship because of randomness in the data. Another way to illustrate 
this is that under these findings if we say that a staggered board affects firm value, 
there is a probability of nearly 20% that this statement is wrong and in reality there 
is no such effect. Formally, this probability is much higher than the standard 5% 
benchmark, or a chance of 1/20. We thus conclude that there is no significant 
negative linear relationship between logQ and a staggered board.62 
The estimated coefficients of the variables that we add to the model 
(columns 3 and 4) are mostly significant, implying that they should not be 
absent from a model determining the effect of a staggered board on firm 
value. Importantly, in Table 3 below we show that some of these added 
variables are significantly related to a staggered board, and thus their absence 
from the regression model in columns 1 and 2 may bias the estimation of the 
effect of a staggered board on logQ. A test of whether the ten additional 
 
61 Cf. Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 2, at 427-28. It is a tribute to Professors Bebchuk and Cohen’s 
work that the results of their model remain significant even as we greatly extend the sample period. 
62 We find the same result when we replicate the analysis using Q as the dependent variable, 
as do Bebchuk and Cohen, instead of logQ. The fit of this model to the data is inferior to that when 
using logQ, which we use in our analysis. When using Q as the dependent variable, the effect of a 
staggered board is negative and significant in the Bebchuk–Cohen model. Cf. Bebchuk & Cohen, 
supra note 2, at 428. However, it becomes insignificant in the Additional Variables model. 
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variables increase the explanatory power of the model finds that their joint 
contribution is highly statistically significant.63 
In Table 2 we add to the model the variable Modified E-Index, the 
entrenchment index of Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell net of the staggered 
board provision which appears separately in the model.64 Modified E-Index, 
which includes a count of five governance-related provisions (but excludes 
the staggered board provision, which appears separately in the model), 
controls for the existence of governance or agency problems in the firm.65 
Across firms, there is a strong positive correlation between Staggered Board 
and Modified E-Index. That is, firms that have a staggered board are more 
likely to have other governance-related provisions. Bebchuk and Cohen also 
account for this issue in their regressions by using a related governance index, 
the G-Index devised by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick.66 The goal of including 
measures of corporate governance is to account for how those measures affect 
firm value directly rather than indirectly through their influence on, or 
relationship with, staggered board adoption. 
 
Table 2: The Effect on Firm Value of Staggered 
Board and Modified E-Index67 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Staggered Board 
-0.009 -0.013 -0.000 -0.005 
(-0.844) (-1.183) (-0.029) (-0.403) 
Modified E-Index 
-0.024*** -0.025*** -0.028*** -0.023*** 
(-4.842) (-4.889) (-5.524) (-4.114) 
N 27,016 21,806 23,962 16,599 
Firms 2961 2456 2593 2006 
R2 0.410 0.444 0.438 0.480 
 
 
63 For instance, a test of the contribution of the additional variables in column 3 as compared to 
those in column 1 yields a value of F = 51.0 with a p-value < 0.001, which implies a very high significance. 
64 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
65 See also Bebchuk et al., supra note 2, at 784-85 (discussing how the factors included in the 
E-Index affect corporate governance by “limit[ing] the extent to which a majority of shareholders 
can impose their will on management”). 
66 See Gompers et al., supra note 47, at 109 (describing the G-Index “as a proxy for the balance 
of power between shareholders and managers”). 
67 The dependent variable is logQ, where Q is the ratio of the firm’s market value to book value of 
assets. Modified E-Index is Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell’s entrenchment index excluding staggered board 
(whose effect is estimated separately). The regressions also include all control variables that appear in 
Table 1, but their coefficients are not reported to save space. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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The estimation results in Table 2 show that in the presence of Modified E-Index, 
the coefficient of Staggered Board is not statistically significant while the coefficient 
of Modified E-Index is negative and highly significant.68 Notably, the insignificance 
of the value effect of a staggered board is not only statistical but also economical, 
meaning that the magnitude of the effect of Staggered Board, measured by its 
coefficient, is practically zero in columns 3 and 4. We conclude that firms with more 
governance-related measures that are included in Modified E-Index have lower 
value, as proposed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell.69 But after accounting for the 
effect of governance problems, the value effect of a staggered board is insignificant. 
The negative value effect of Modified E-Index is puzzling given that the 
components of Modified E-Index hardly affect the likelihood of a firm being 
acquired. Modified E-Index includes five corporate governance measures: the 
poison pill, golden parachute, supermajority voting requirement for mergers, 
limits to amend bylaws, and limits to amend the charter.70 In theory, none of 
these should have a significant effect in terms of entrenching the board and 
consequently on firm value. Golden parachutes may make a takeover more 
costly, but typically have no potency in stopping hostile acquisitions. The 
effect of a poison pill should be already incorporated in the firm’s value 
whether or not the firm has explicitly adopted one, since every firm potentially 
has a shadow poison pill that can be adopted by the board of directors at any 
time, and research has shown that its presence does not significantly affect 
firm value.71 The other provisions in Modified E-Index are also not considered 
to be potent in stopping hostile takeover bids or significant determinants of 
firm value. Indeed, Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell point out that the 
documented negative relation between the E-Index and firm value “does not 
establish that the entrenching provisions . . . cause lower firm valuation.”72 
A possible explanation for the negative value effect of Modified E-Index is 
that the provisions included in it are symptoms of the firm having an agency 
problem, which cannot be directly observed. Firms with a high modified E-Index 
may have poorly performing boards, which is reflected both in a higher propensity 
 
68 One reason that the value effect of a staggered board is insignificant when Modified E-Index is 
included in the model is the positive correlation of 0.23 between these variables, which is highly significant 
(p < 0.001) in the sample that includes all variables (columns 3 and 4). When Modified E-Index is excluded, 
its effect is partially assumed by Staggered Board, but when Modified E-Index is included, its effect on 
logQ is estimated directly while that of Staggered Board is considerably weakened (to the extent of 
becoming indistinguishable from zero). 
69 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 2, at 785. 
70 See supra note 10. 
71 See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the 
Scientific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271, 277 (2000) (“[E]very firm has a ‘shadow pill’—that is, bidders 
know targets can adopt a pill after a bid, so that adoption of an actual pill has no effect on a target’s 
legal takeover vulnerability.” (footnote omitted)). 
72 Bebchuk et al., supra note 2, at 785. 
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of managers to adopt (or retain) the governance provisions measured by Modified 
E-Index and in lower firm value.73 As a result there is a negative correlation 
between logQ and Modified E-Index even if the provisions in Modified E-Index are 
not potent deterrents of hostile takeover bids and are not the cause of the lower 
firm value.74 Similarly, the staggered board provision may indicate the existence 
of a value-reducing agency problem in the firm rather than a cause for the value 
reduction. When a better indicator of agency problems—Modified E-Index—is 
included in the model, the effect of a staggered board becomes insignificant.75 
We further test whether the value effect of a staggered board depends on the 
magnitude of Modified E-Index. If a higher modified E-Index indicates a more 
severe agency problem in the firm, a staggered board provision would have a more 
negative value effect if it enables the problem to persist. We test this hypothesis 
by adding the interaction term Staggered Board*Modified E-Index to the model. The 
coefficient of this variable should be negative if a staggered board exacerbates the 
value loss due to the modified E-Index. We find that the coefficients of both 
Staggered Board and Staggered Board*Modified E-Index are insignificantly different 
from zero, while the coefficient of Modified E-Index remains negative and highly 
significant. We conclude that the effect of a staggered board on firm value is 
insignificant even in conjunction with the modified E-Index.76 
In conclusion, we observe that the previously documented negative effect 
of a staggered board on firm value is not robust to what we term model 
specification. Specifically, its effect becomes statistically insignificant when 
we account for the omitted variables problem we have previously highlighted. 
 
73 An alternative explanation is that more provisions in the modified E-Index are adopted (or 
retained) when management perceives a problem in the firm that needs to be rectified. Then 
causality does not run from the modified E-Index to firm value but rather in the opposite direction. 
That is, it is the lower firm value—perhaps a temporary problem in management’s view, which can 
be remedied—that leads to the higher modified E-Index. 
74 A question that arises here is if the provisions that are the components of Modified E-Index are 
not potent, why do some managers adopt or keep them? It could be that some managers believe that 
these provisions help or at least will not hurt. It could also be that a firm in trouble offers a generous 
golden parachute (one of the provisions in Modified E-Index) in order to attract a good manager who 
otherwise would not want to work there. Then again, the negative relation between Modified E-Index 
and firm value does not mean that the former causes the latter but that it could be the other way around. 
75 Testing the robustness of the results, we split the sample period into two subperiods and estimate 
the effect of a staggered board on logQ for each subperiod. We find that the coefficient of Staggered Board 
is not significant in any of the subperiods. Even when the model does not include Modified E-Index, we 
find that the coefficients of Staggered Board in columns 3 and 4 in the two subperiods are not significantly 
different from zero, especially for the second subperiod. This finding is grist for further study, but one 
explanation may be that the market has learned over time that a staggered board is harmless on average, 
or it developed governance mechanisms that rendered a staggered board inconsequential. 
76 In unreported results we perform robustness tests, replicating our analysis using industry-fixed 
effects that employ the Fama–French industrial classification, as do Bebchuk and Cohen. Cf. 
Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 2, at 420. Our results with this industrial classification are similar to 
those reported in Table 1, though the effect of a staggered board here is less significant than in Table 
1. The coefficient on Staggered Board becomes insignificant even in a model similar to column 1. 
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2. The Determinants of a Staggered Board 
Our analyses in Tables 1 and 2 include variables that have been historically 
omitted from empirical analyses of the staggered board’s value effect. If these 
variables were not related to Staggered Board, their omission from the models 
in Tables 1 and 2, which estimate the effect of a staggered board on firm value, 
would not have biased the estimated effect of Staggered Board. In Table 3 we 
address this issue by analyzing the determinants of the staggered board to 
detect whether the results in Tables 1 and 2 are attributable to omitted variables. 
Table 3 presents estimates of the effects on Staggered Board of the variables that 
are included in columns 3 and 4 of Table 1. The dependent variable is Staggered 
Board, which equals 1 if the firm has a staggered board. The models also include 
the variable Past 3yr Return, the average annual stock return over the preceding 
three years.77 We theorize that Past 3yr Return negatively affects the likelihood of 
the firm having a staggered board. Following negative past performance, 
management may feel that the firm is vulnerable to acquisition “on the cheap” by 
a hostile raider.78 It may then want to implement a strategic plan to improve its 
performance but because outside stockholders may not be fully informed about 
the benefits of this plan, its effect will not be immediately reflected in the 
stockprice.79 On the other hand, managers in fairly priced or overvalued firms will 
not have such a concern and will not mind if their firm is acquired. Such managers 








77 The model also includes industry-fixed effects based on two-digit SIC classification. The 
results are qualitatively similar when using the forty-nine Fama–French industries. 
78 See Emiliano M. Catan, The Insignificance of Clear-Day Poison Pills 32 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of 
Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 16-33, Sept. 2016), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2836223 [https://perma.cc/R8WW-MV5M] (finding similar results in the 
context of poison pill adoption). We do not take a stand here on whether a staggered board is a 
potent deterrent to hostile acquisitions; it suffices that some managers believe so and adopt or retain 
a staggered board as a means of protection against a hostile acquisition. 
79 Alternatively, management could be biased in believing that its plan will succeed (otherwise 
they would not have implemented it) and thus it will attempt to adopt or retain a staggered board 
provision hoping that it would buy the firm time to improve its value. 
80 The variable Past 3yr Return is not included in Table 1 because we find that it does not affect firm 
value (as measured by logQ) given that the model includes other performance variables which affect firm 
value, and since the variable Past 3yr Return is measured with a gap of one year before the current year. 
1496 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 166: 1475 
Table 3: The Determinants of Staggered Board81 
 










Past 3yr Return 
-0.019*** -0.018**
(-3.214) (-2.160)





































81 The explanatory variables are those that appear in columns 3 and 4 of Table 1, with the 
addition of Past 3yr Return. The model also includes industry-fixed effects using two-digit SIC code 
and year-fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered by firm. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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We find that the incidence of a firm having a staggered board is not random; 
rather, it has an economic explanation. In particular, past performance variables 
have a negative effect on whether the firm has a staggered board. Firms that do 
well—those with faster sales growth, higher profit margins, and past stockprice 
appreciation—are less likely to adopt and retain a staggered board. We also 
observe that size, firm age, and the dummy variable for whether the firm is 
included in the S&P 500 index have a significant negative coefficient, suggesting 
that larger, more mature, and more established firms are less likely to have a 
staggered board. Firms with higher R&D spending, higher leverage, and higher 
asset liquidity are also less likely to have a staggered board. Additionally, firms 
with higher institutional ownership and with higher stock illiquidity are less 
likely to have a staggered board. Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, more takeover 
activity in a firm’s industry is negatively related to the likelihood of a firm having 
a staggered board. This finding requires further study. 
The importance of having a broad set of variables to explain logQ in Tables 
1 and 2 is evident from our findings in Table 3 that some of these variables 
have conflicting effects on logQ and on Staggered Board. We find in Table 3 that 
the very firm characteristics that positively affect value are those that make 
Staggered Board unnecessary and hence enter with a negative coefficient in 
Table 3 (or vice versa).82 This may explain why the negative and significant 
 
82 To illustrate, consider the variable for the firm’s asset liquidity, Liquid Assets. It positively affects 
logQ (columns 3 and 4 in Table 1) and is negatively related to Staggered Board (Table 3). If Liquid Assets 
is omitted from the determinants of logQ, its negative association with Staggered Board and its positive 
relation to logQ will be expressed as a negative relation between Staggered Board and logQ. When Liquid 
Assets is included in the model in Table 1, its positive effect on logQ is estimated directly and not through 
Staggered Board. Accordingly, the negative effect of Staggered Board becomes weaker and insignificant. 
The same analysis applies to R&D which has a strong positive effect on logQ and a strong negative 
effect on Staggered Board. Other variables have conflicting effects on logQ and Staggered Board—Sales 
Growth, S&P500, Profit Margin, and No Deals—and thus their omission from the models in Table 1 
would bias the coefficient of Staggered Board there, showing it to have a negative effect on Q. 
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effect of a staggered board on logQ in columns 1 and 2 in Table 1 becomes 
insignificant in columns 3 and 4 when we add control variables to the model. 
The omission of these variables from models 1 and 2 in Table 1 biases the effect 
of a staggered board on logQ and makes us believe that a staggered board affects 
firm value while in fact the estimated negative effect of a staggered board on Q 
is due to the effect of a missing variable on both Staggered Board and Q.83 
3. The Effect of a Staggered Board on Firm  
Value Using Firm-Fixed Effects 
The scope of the staggered board debate has changed due to the recent 
research of Cremers, Litov, and Sepe, which has led to dueling accusations 
about the true effect of a staggered board. These authors present evidence of a 
positive effect of a staggered board on firm value when estimating the model 
with firm-fixed effects.84 As we discussed above, firm-fixed effects control for 
unobserved time-invariant firm characteristics (or characteristics that change 
very slowly) which pertain to the effect of a firm’s staggered board on its value. 
Since we cannot always observe all the firm characteristics that affect value and 
the incidence of having a staggered board, the use of firm-fixed effects is a catchall 
way to control for these characteristics. However, some firm characteristics 
change over time, or the effects of these characteristics may change, and these 
changes may induce firms to adopt a staggered board or to destagger their board, 
while at the same time affecting firm value. The reason for the earlier results may 
be related to unobserved changing characteristics (or the changing effects of these 
characteristics) which caused the relationship between a staggered board and firm 
value. It may have been these changing characteristics themselves rather than 
related changes in staggered board status that affected value. By splitting the 
sample, we allow for the unobserved firm characteristics to vary over time and 
have their own effect on value, and then we observe that the effect on value 
attributed to a staggered board becomes insignificant. Not recognizing such 
changes may bias the estimated effect of a staggered board on firm value.85 
In testing the findings of Cremers, Litov, and Sepe, we first estimate the 
effect of a staggered board on firm value for the entire sample, assuming that 
the unobserved firm characteristics remain constant over this entire period. 
Next, we estimate the same model over two subperiods of (approximately) 
 
83 The variable Modified E-Index has a conflicting relation with logQ and Staggered Board. It is 
negatively correlated with the former variable and positively correlated with the latter. Its inclusion 
in the model explaining firm value renders the effect of Staggered Board insignificant. 
84 See Cremers et al., supra note 3, at 427-29. This result is consistent with earlier findings. See 
Cremers & Ferrell, supra note 3, at 1188. 
85 Naturally, not all firms in the sample stay in it for the entire twenty-three-year period. In 
our sample, the average number of years a firm stays in the sample is 15.2; the median is 16 years. 
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the same length of time, assuming that the unobserved firm characteristics 
remain invariant within each subperiod. Notably, the second subperiod is 
characterized by a wave of destaggering, principally driven by the efforts of 
the Harvard Rights Project. The dependent variable is again logQ, in order to 
examine the effect of our variables on firm value, and the main explanatory 
variables are Staggered Board and Modified E-Index. We also use the Additional 
Variables model, the comprehensive set of control variables that we use in 
columns 3 and 4 of Tables 1 and 2. In Panel A of Table 4, columns 1 through 
3, we report results for the Additional Variables model. Panel B reports results 
for the Additional Variables model, with the addition of two ownership 
variables, Insider Ownership and Institutional Holdings. We add these variables 
in order to better assess the effect of shareholdings on the presence or absence 
of a staggered board. In both panels, columns 4 through 6 replicate columns 

























86 We use year- and firm-fixed effects to replace the use of year- and industry-fixed effects from 
Table 1. 
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Table 4: The Effect of a Staggered Board on  
Firm Value Using Firm-Fixed Effects87 
 
Panel A: Without Ownership Variables
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample 
Period 
1991–2013 1991–2002 2003–2013 1991–2013 1991–2002 2003–2013
[I & II] [I] [II] [I & II] [I] [II] 
Staggered 
Board 
0.025 -0.023 0.017 0.031** -0.021 0.019 
(1.596) (-0.798) (1.047) (1.964) (-0.703) (1.149)
Modified 
E-Index 
   -0.014*** -0.005 -0.009 
 (-2.867) (-0.601) (-1.605)
N 24,295 11,753 12,471 24,295 11,753 12,471
R2 (within) 0.249 0.170 0.268 0.250 0.170 0.268
 
Panel B: Including Ownership Variables
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample 
Period 
1993–2013 1993–2003 2004–2013 1993–2013 1993–2003 2004–2013
[I & II] [I] [II] [I & II] [I] [II] 
Staggered 
Board 
0.036** -0.002 0.018 0.040** 0.001 0.019 
(2.047) (-0.062) (1.152) (2.284) (0.034) (1.210)
Modified 
E-Index 
 -0.013** -0.006 -0.005
 (-2.269) (-0.608) (-0.858)
N 16,650 7096 9482 16,650 7096 9482 
R2 (within) 0.273 0.195 0.298 0.274 0.195 0.298
 
For the entire sample period we observe that the coefficient of Staggered 
Board is positive and mostly significant, consistent with the results of Cremers, 
Litov, and Sepe. This applies to both Panels A and B. The weaker significance 
of the coefficient of Staggered Board here may be attributed to the fact that our 
model includes additional explanatory variables. The coefficient of Staggered 
Board remains positive and its statistical significance rises in Panel A when 
Modified E-Index is added to the model. The coefficient of Modified E-Index is 
negative and significant, consistent with the results reported earlier in Table 2. 
However, the coefficient of Staggered Board becomes statistically 
insignificant in both panels once the sample is split into two subperiods of 
 
87 The dependent variable is logQ, where Q is the ratio of the firm’s market value to book value of 
assets. The table presents the results from firm-fixed effects regressions. To save space, we report only 
the coefficients of Staggered Board and Modified E-Index, sample size, and the R2 of the model. All 
regressions include firm- and year-fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered by firm. The symbols 
** and *** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% level. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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approximately equal length. Importantly, the coefficient of Staggered Board is 
not consistent across the subperiods. Instead, the coefficient flips between 
being negative in the first and positive in the second. The takeaway from this 
analysis is consistent with our conclusion following the analysis in Tables 1 
and 2: a staggered board has no significant effect on firm value. 
The result that a staggered board does not significantly affect firm value is 
consistent with recent evidence presented by Cremers and Sepe on the value 
effect of board destaggering related to the Harvard Rights Project. They note 
that firm value generally declined after board declassification, but “only board 
declassification in [Project] targets is associated with a statistically significant 
reduction in firm value . . . declassifications at firms not targeted by the [Project] 
have a statistically and economically insignificant association with firm value.”88 
The conclusion of Cremers and Sepe that destaggering has no significant 
effect on the value of firms not targeted by the Harvard Rights Project is 
consistent with ours because the firms targeted by the Project are a very small 
number of the staggering and destaggering cases in our sample. Our analysis in 
Table 4, which extends from 1991 through 2013, includes 61 cases of staggering 
and 297 cases of destaggering, a total of 358 instances of a change in staggered 
board status. On this basis, we estimate that destaggerings in firms targeted by 
the Harvard Rights Project constitute about 14% of the destaggering cases in our 
sample.89 In addition, Cremers and Sepe point out that even among the Harvard 
Rights Project–targeted firms, the negative effect of a destaggering on firm 
value was confined to firms with high research and development expenditures.90 
It follows that for about 90% of our sample, our results that a staggered board 
has no significant effect on firm value are consistent with the results of Cremers 
and Sepe for firms that were not targeted by the Harvard Rights Project. 
4. A Note on Endogeneity 
Our results on the insignificant effect of a staggered board on firm value 
are supported by further analysis that we perform in our paper Do Staggered 
Boards Affect Firm Value?91 There we address an issue recurrent in prior studies 
regarding staggered boards and firm value: that the implementation of a 
staggered board defense—its adoption, retention, or deletion—is a choice 
 
88 Cremers & Sepe, supra note 6, at 5 (emphasis added). 
89 We calculate this by noting that Cremers and Sepe find that half of board destaggering 
cases from 2012 to 2014 were in firms targeted by the Harvard Rights Project. Of these cases, 
eighty-three occurred in 2012 and 2013, a time that is included in our sample period. Accordingly, 
about forty-two destaggering cases in our sample are expected to have been a result of the actions of 
the Harvard Shareholder Rights Project, which is about 14% of the destaggering cases in our sample. 
90 Id. at 22-24. 
91 Yakov Amihud et al., Do Staggered Boards Affect Firm Value? (June 29, 2017) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2948141 [https://perma.cc/K3TS-5L7A]. 
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made by the firms themselves.92 The decision to implement a staggered board 
is affected by unique firm characteristics and by the views and objectives of its 
decisionmakers.93 This raises a problem of selection and endogeneity, a major 
empirical issue also acknowledged by Bebchuk and Cohen.94 The key question 
that stems from the issue of selection and endogeneity is whether the presence 
of a staggered board affects firm value, or whether the firm’s low value causes 
a staggered board to be adopted. Underperforming firms may decide to adopt 
a staggered board in order to stall a potential underpriced takeover attempt 
and to enable the implementation of performance-enhancing policies. In such 
a scenario, the staggered board does not cause the low valuation of a firm but 
instead is a symptom or a consequence of it; that is, it will be implemented by 
such a firm in order to enable it to remedy its low valuation. The question, 
then, is whether the negative relation between a staggered board and firm 
value is caused by the latter or the former. 
This endogeneity problem raises the need for an empirical analysis using 
an exogenous event associated with a staggered board adoption (or rejection). 
An exogenous event is independent of the firm’s characteristics and therefore 
can help isolate the effect of the staggered board on firm value. An example 
of such an event is the mandatory legislation of staggered boards by 
Massachusetts in 1990. In response to a hostile bid by BTR, an English firm, 
against Norton, a Massachusetts company, the Massachusetts state legislature 
passed a statute requiring that all public companies in Massachusetts have a 
staggered board.95 Company boards could opt out of the statutory 
 
92 More specifically, the implementation of a staggered board requires the approval of the firm’s 
board, followed by the approval of the firm’s shareholders, if placed in the certificate of incorporation. 
The clause implementing a staggered board can also be placed in the firm’s bylaws without shareholder 
approval, but this is known as an ineffective staggered board since shareholders can unilaterally 
remove the staggered board by amending the bylaws. See generally Bebchuk et al., supra note 15, at 894. 
93 A notable exception to these determining factors can be found in Massachusetts legislation 
mandating a three-year staggered term for directors in every Massachusetts firm. See MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 156D, § 8.06 (2017). 
94 See Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 2, at 410-11, 426 (“Do staggered boards bring about a lower 
firm value? Or, is the correlation produced by the selection of staggered boards by firms with lower 
firm values—either because boards of low-value firms feel more vulnerable to a takeover or because 
low-quality management tends to both produce low value and seek antitakeover protection?”); see 
also Alma Cohen & Charles C.Y. Wang, How Do Staggered Boards Affect Shareholder Value? Evidence 
from a Natural Experiment, 110 J. FIN. ECON. 627, 627-28 (2013) (“Governance provisions that weaken 
shareholder rights and insulate directors from removal are now well known to be negatively 
correlated with firm value . . . . Such correlation, however, might not imply causation but could 
reflect the greater propensity of low-value firms to maintain such provisions.”). 
95 § 8.06. For an account of the law’s history and passage, see generally L. Mick Swartz, The 
Massachusetts Classified Board Law, 22 J. ECON. & FIN. 29 (1998). 
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requirement, but they could opt back in at any time. Maryland has passed a 
similar statute, though it has received much less attention.96 
Professor L. Mick Swartz, who studies the value consequences of the 
Massachusetts legislation mandating staggered boards, found the law had no 
significant effect on the stock values of firms which had no staggered board, 
neither on the introduction day nor on the passage day of the law.97 Examining 
the differential value effect of the law on firms with and without a staggered board, 
he found that there was no significant difference in the value effect of the law 
between the two groups.98 There was, however, a difference in price reaction 
between firms with and without already existent antitakeover amendments in 
their corporate charters.99 The value of those firms without antitakeover 
provisions declined by sixteen percent.100 In a recent study of this event by Robert 
Daines, Shelley Xin Li, and Charles Wang, the authors find that the imposition 
of a staggered board on firms led to an increase in Tobin’s Q for younger, 
innovative firms and evidence that this is attributable to increased R&D and 
capital expenditure.101 The authors note that their findings cover a dataset different 
than typically used in other studies, which tend to include more mature firms.102 
Additional exogenous events that have been analyzed for their impact on 
firm value are two 2010 Delaware court rulings in Air Products & Chemicals 
Inc. v. Airgas, which have arguably affected the potency of the staggered board 
provision.103 Cohen and Wang indicate in a new study that these rulings 
affected the value of Delaware-incorporated firms in a way that suggests 
staggered boards are value-decreasing; that is, increasing the potency of 
staggered boards reduces firm value while weakening it raises firm value.104 
However, in reassessing these claims, Yakov Amihud and Stoyan Stoyanov 
found that after making adjustments in the estimation procedure and in the 
data, changes in the potency of a staggered board had no significant effect on 
 
96 MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 3-803 (LexisNexis 2018). For a critical evaluation of the 




97 Swartz, supra note 95, at 32. 
98 Id. at 33. 
99 Id. For the purposes of his study, Swartz defines antitakeover amendments as provisions in a firm’s 
corporate charter—other than the implementation of a staggered board—that are designed to limit takeovers. 
100 Id. 
101 Robert Daines et al., Can Staggered Boards Improve Value? Evidence from the Massachusetts 
Natural Experiment 23-24 (Sept. 2016) (European Corp. Governance Inst., Fin. Working Paper No. 
499/2017, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2836463 [https://perma.cc/GQ6P-MAWN]. 
102 Id. at 3-4. 
103 For an explanation of these rulings, see generally Davidoff, supra note 14. 
104 Alma Cohen & Charles C.Y. Wang, Reexamining Staggered Boards and Shareholder Value, 125 
J. FIN. ECON. 637, 638 (2017). 
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firm value.105 These results are consistent with both the findings of Swartz on 
the Massachusetts staggered board law and our own findings that a staggered 
board has no significant effect on firm value. 
Bebchuk and Cohen address the endogeneity issue by estimating a firm’s 
value (i.e., its Tobin’s Q) as a function of the firm’s staggered board as of 1990, 
when the ISS database began to document the phenomenon.106 They suggest 
that in firms with staggered boards in 1990, shareholders had no power to 
remove it, while “shareholders were generally unwilling to permit existing 
firms to adopt charter-based staggered boards during the 1990s.”107 The two 
authors thus theorize that subsequent effects of the staggered board are not 
related to firm characteristics but rather the “exogenous” event of a staggered 
board being present in 1990.108 In this estimation of firms’ value as a function 
of staggered board provisions in 1990 they find again that the effect of 
staggered board on firm value is negative and significant.109 
In our paper, Do Staggered Boards Affect Firm Value?, we address the 
endogeneity problem by employing the common method of instrumental 
variables.110 This method recognizes that staggering or destaggering of 
corporate boards is a matter for firm choice, and it identifies instrumental 
variables that explain these governance changes.111 The requirement is that 
the selected instrumental variables affect only the incidence of the firm 
having a staggered board without directly affecting its value. We have already 
seen from Table 3 that the incidence of a staggered board is not random but 
instead is a function of firm characteristics. In this earlier paper, we augment 
the set of explanatory variables with a set of instrumental variables. 
 
105 See Yakov Amihud & Stoyan Stoyanov, Do Staggered Boards Harm Shareholders?, 123 J. FIN. ECON. 
432, 438 (2017). For Cohen and Wang’s response, see Alma Cohen & Charles C.Y. Wang, Staggered Boards 
and Shareholder Value: A Reply to Amihud and Stoyanov (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 16-097, 2016), 
https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/25680333/16-097.pdf?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/
XH7B-ZYD9]. 
106 Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 2, at 426-27. 
107 Id. at 426. 
108 Id. at 428. 
109 Id. 
110 See Amihud et al., supra note 91, at 5-6. We also address the selection issue in this second paper. More 
specifically, firms with a staggered board may have characteristics which lend itself to a staggered board, such 
as a low stockprice relative to firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q. We do so by recognizing that the 
destaggering of corporate boards is now common. Since the Bebchuk–Cohen study, which ended in 2002, 
many firms destaggered their boards (350 in the ISS sample, 291 in our sample), and between 1990 and 2013, 
101 firms adopted staggered boards (69 are included in our sample). This enables us to address the selection 
problem by studying the determinants of the choice of firms adopting, having, or removing staggered boards. 
111 See also id. at 16 (recognizing the likelihood of a firm having a staggered board is not random 
and is thus affected by firm characteristics). 
2018] Settling the Staggered Board Debate 1505 
We found that the (instrumented) staggered board has no significant effect 
on firm value.112 This result is obtained under both methods, that of Bebchuk 
and Cohen and that of Cremers, Litov, and Sepe. In both models, the coefficient 
of Staggered Board is insignificantly different from zero.113 This result—sharing 
the insignificant value effect of a staggered board after having accounted for 
endogeneity—is consistent with the results presented in this Article. 
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Our finding that a staggered board has no significant effect on firm value 
does not discredit earlier studies which found significant negative or positive 
effects of a staggered board. Instead, our findings suggest caution in 
proposing that the staggered board in and of itself creates wealth effects. A 
staggered board may be beneficial in some firms while being detrimental or 
inconsequential in others, depending on their characteristics and on the 
reasons for having the staggered board. On average, a staggered board cannot 
be said to have an effect in one way or another. Therefore, a policy dictum 
that equally applies to all firms is, in our view, inappropriate. 
Our findings also do not mean that in the heat of a takeover battle, the 
staggered board has no real effect in either frustrating a bid or causing a higher 
premium to be paid. Prior studies have addressed these issues,114 and this Article 
takes no position on them. But what our results do show is that on average—and 
looking forward at the firm’s operations as a whole—the staggered board does not 
produce a wealth effect for companies. This implies that the staggered board in 
general does not serve as an entrenching device that facilitates managerial waste. 
The existence of a staggered board or its lack thereof is not random. It is more 
likely to be observed among firms with poor past performance that are incorporated 
in some states, and it is ubiquitous in certain industries and less common in others. 
The dependence of having a staggered board on firm characteristics reflects a 
conscious, systematic choice by some firms to have or not to have a staggered board, 
although it does not exclude the possibility that in some cases the staggered board 
 
112 Id. at 5-6. The instrumental variables that we include in our analysis are the following: four dummy 
variables for four states of incorporation (Massachusetts, New York, California, and Pennsylvania), as well 
as Past 3yr Return, which we use as a variable that determines the incidence of a staggered board. Id. at 15-16. 
While these variables are strong determinants of the incidence of the firm having a staggered board, they do 
not predict firm value. In some tests, we use two additional instruments which make use of peer firms’ 
characteristics and were identified by Professors Karpoff, Schonlau, and Wehrly. See Jonathan M. Karpoff 
et al., Do Takeover Defense Indices Measure Takeover Deterrence? 30 REV. FIN. STUD. 2359, 2362 (2017). 
113 Amihud et al., supra note 91, at 6. The insignificant value effect of a staggered board is 
obtained without including Modified E-Index in the model, and it remains insignificant when we 
include Modified E-Index. 
114 See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., supra note 15, at 890-91 (finding that a staggered board makes a 
hostile bid more difficult and reduces aggregate returns to shareholders). 
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is unnecessarily adopted or mistakenly removed (or absent in the first place). For 
example, better performing firms, or firms with stronger market power, are less 
likely to adopt and retain a staggered board, or they are more likely to destagger 
their board. This evidence supports the theoretical notion that companies adopt a 
staggered board to prevent an undervaluing takeover, and that for firms in 
competition, takeover-impeding measures are nonconsequential. Ultimately, this is 
a basis to analyze a staggered board on an individualized basis. In all, our analysis 
highlights the likely idiosyncrasy of the staggered board. 
Our results set a path for future research on the staggered board. Bebchuk 
and Cohen as well as Cremers, Litov, and Sepe have set an admirable standard 
for initial research on this matter. Future research may further examine the 
problems of omitted variables by testing more thoroughly the reasons for the 
adoption, maintenance, and deletion of a staggered board provision. It may also 
examine whether market monitors can function independently of the staggered 
board to substitute for this governance function, ameliorating its idiosyncratic 
effects. Further work can more finely examine under what conditions and in 
which industries the staggered board serves an appropriate corporate governance 
function. Finally, it is important to note that the analysis done on this issue is 
based mainly on companies included in the ISS database, which covers the S&P 
1500 firms. There has been a paucity of research on the staggered board and its 
wealth effects in smaller companies due to a lack of available data. It is uncertain 
whether the results found in larger, more closely observed companies will hold 
for smaller companies. Yet, in terms of market value and the effect on the 
economy, the companies in the S&P 1500 list are the most important. 
More generally, our findings have implications for other corporate 
governance studies which could also be plagued by the omitted variables that are 
correlated with governance provisions. This can inform the debate over whether 
“one size fits all” governance is appropriate for companies with different 
characteristics. Our results are thus in line with the study of Professors Cain, 
McKeon, and Davidoff Solomon examining seventeen takeover laws and finding 
that previous studies which had attributed negative wealth effects to the adoption 
of business combination laws were instead observing effects from other 
variables.115 Similarly, Professors Catan and Kahan show that earlier studies on 
the effects of business combination laws do not withstand further scrutiny,116 and 
that—in the poison pill context—there is a need to control for the variables that 
brought about the adoption of the poison pill.117 The collective findings thus 
 
115 See Matthew D. Cain et al., Do Takeover Laws Matter? Evidence from Five Decades of Hostile 
Takeovers, 124 J. FIN. ECON. 464, 466 (2017). 
116 Emiliano M. Catan & Marcel Kahan, The Law and Finance of Antitakeover Statutes, 68 STAN. 
L. REV. 629, 634 (2016). 
117 Id. at 647. 
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highlight that in examining other studies, accounting for econometric estimation 
issues is likely important. Like our results on staggered boards, this also suggests 
a measure of caution in wholesale acceptance or rejection of corporate governance 
provisions which apply uniformly to firms without clear empirical support.118 
The staggered board debate highlights that, in the first instance, the parties 
are resorting to the empirical evidence and their interpretation of the findings to 
justify policy prescriptions for the treatment of a staggered board, as well as for 
the proper contractual arrangement of the board among shareholders and the 
company. We applaud this resort to empirical evidence to justify these policy 
prescriptions. Yet as we show, when proper controls for omitted variable bias are 
included, there does not appear to be a value effect of the staggered board as a 
whole—it neither reduces nor increases value. At a minimum our findings are 
contrary to the call by Cremers and Sepe for a quasi-mandatory staggered board. 
In addition, our findings also mitigate against a per se ban of a staggered board. 
Instead, our findings point to the staggered board being idiosyncratic and 
endogenous, good for some—but not all—companies, and perhaps bad for others. 
These findings also inform views of attempts to eliminate the staggered board 
in the S&P 500. The Harvard Rights Project claims that it successfully was able 
to reduce the presence of a staggered board from 60% to 25% of these companies.119 
Our findings do not support state intervention either to ban or require the 
staggered board. Instead, our findings support each firm making an individualized 
choice. In today’s complex capital markets, large capitalized companies likely face 
forces and pressures that counteract a staggered board’s force and pull, pressuring 
otherwise entrenched boards to act in ways that are aligned with stockholders’ 
interests regardless of whether a staggered board is present or not. In such a 
circumstance, a staggered board may not be necessary or harmful, and company 
responsiveness to the Harvard Rights Project supports this idea. 
CONCLUSION 
We revisit the question of whether a staggered board affects firm value, 
given conflicting results in prior studies. Bebchuk and Cohen found that a 
 
118 For other articles making this point, see Matthew D. Cain et al., How Corporate Governance is Made: 
The Case of the Golden Leash, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 649, 654 (2016), and Randall S. Thomas, The Increasing Role 
of Empirical Research in Corporate Law Scholarship, 92 GEO. L.J. 981, 983 (2004) (reviewing MARK ROE, 
POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2003)). The need for caution we suggest is 
consistent with the findings of Professors Black, de Carvalho, Khanna, Kim, and Yurtoglu. The authors 
examine prior studies of corporate governance indices like the E-Index and find that these indices are often 
constructed based upon vague governance measures or unobserved governance characteristics. See Bernard 
Black et al., Corporate Governance Indices and Construct Validity, 25 CORP. GOVERNANCE 397, 398 (2017). 
This too can be said about studies of the effects of the staggered board provision. Our results show that 
previous beliefs of its effect—whether it is “good” or “bad”—does not hold on closer econometric scrutiny. 
119 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 32, at 165-66. 
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staggered board has negative effect on firm value, a result supported by 
subsequent studies, while a recent study by Cremers, Litov, and Sepe found 
that the effect of a staggered board on firm value is positive. These conflicting 
results are supported by differing theoretical arguments: opponents of the 
staggered board claim that it induces and perpetuates underperformance by 
firms, while proponents claim that it helps create long-term value. 
We contend that previous studies on the effect of a staggered board on firm 
value did not include firm characteristics and performance measures that affect 
firm value and at the same time are correlated with the incidence of a firm 
having a staggered board. Therefore, the effects of these omitted variables have 
been mistakenly attributed to a staggered board. We analyze the Bebchuk and 
Cohen study, include more explanatory variables, and find that in our more 
comprehensive model, the estimated negative effect of a staggered board 
becomes insignificant. That is, the negative value effect that has been attributed 
to the staggered board is in fact due to variables that were omitted in earlier 
analysis. We also find that the results in the study of Cremers, Litov, and Sepe, 
which finds positive firm value in the staggered board, are not robust. We split 
the sample period of years into two subperiods and find that the effect of a 
staggered board on firm value is not significant in either subperiod. 
Our results highlight that the value effect of the staggered board provision 
appears to be firm specific. There is no evidence that it is harmful or helpful for 
all firms on average. Our results indicate caution in any wholesale advocacy for 
the adoption or removal of the staggered board. They also suggest that policy 
proposals for mandatory staggered boards or a per se ban on these boards appear 
to be lacking in definitive empirical support. The staggered board debate is thus 
not about per se rules but whether the staggered board is right for individual firms. 
APPENDIX 
The sample includes all firm-years between 1991 and 2013 for all firms on the 
ISS database (which includes governance provisions) for which data are available 
on COMPUSTAT. Q is the ratio of the firm’s book value to its market value. 
All variables that follow have their values for the previous year. Staggered Board 
equals 1 for firms with a staggered board; Modified E-Index is Bebchuk, Cohen, 
and Ferrell’s entrenchment index of six governance-related provisions, which 
excludes staggered board (hence its value ranges from 0 to 5);120 log(Total Assets) 
is the logarithm of the firm’s total assets (Table 5 reports total assets in million 
USD); log(Age), the logarithm of the firm’s age (Table 6 reports firm age in 
years); Delaware is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is incorporated in 
Delaware; Return on Assets is return on assets, defined as EBITDA divided by 
 
120 See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text. 
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lagged total assets; Capital Expenditures is capital expenditures relative to assets; 
R&D is the ratio of research and development expenditures to sales; R&D 
Missing is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the form does not report R&D; 
Insider Ownership is the share of the company’s stock held by the top five officers 
in the company; Asset Growth is the one-year growth rate of total assets (which 
may reflect recent acquisitions); Sales Growth is the one-year growth rate of sales; 
S&P500 equals 1 if the firm is in the Standard and Poor’s 500 index; Leverage is 
the ratio of total debt (long-term and short-term) to the firm’s total assets; Profit 
Margin is the ratio of the difference between sales and cost of goods sold to total 
sales; Stock Illiquidity is the average daily ratio of absolute stock return to dollar 
volume over the year (we exclude the top 1% of daily observations within each 
year and require at least 150 daily observations to compute the annual variable); 
Liquid Assets is the asset liquidity, defined as current assets minus the difference 
between current liabilities and debt in current liabilities, all divided by total 
assets. Number of Deals is the number of acquisitions in the industry and No Deals 
is a dummy variable that equals one if Number of Deals equals zero. Both of these 
deal variables are based on four-digit SIC codes. Industry Sales Share is the firm’s 
sales share in the total industry share, using two-digit SIC codes. In the 
calculation of Industry Sales Share we use all COMPUSTAT firms. Institutional 
Holdings is the share of the company’s stock held by institutional investors; Past 
3yr Return is the average annual stock return over the last three years. All ratios 
are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level to avoid outliers. The sample excludes 
REITs, dual-class share firms, and firms in the lowest and highest 1% of market 
capitalization in the respective year. We also delete an entire industry if all firms 
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for the Variables Used in Our Analysis 
 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Q 1.795 1.422 1.157 
Staggered Board 0.592 1.000 0.491 
Modified E-Index 1.620 2.000 1.061 
Log(Total Assets) 9521 1577 57,228 
Log(Age) 26.485 22.000 18.742 
Delaware 0.589 1.000 0.492 
Return on Assets 0.145 0.136 0.115 
Capital 
Expenditures 
0.061 0.043 0.064 
R&D 0.055 0.000 0.316 
R&D Missing 0.474 0.000 0.499 
Insider 
Ownership 
0.031 0.007 0.066 
Asset Growth 1.105 1.060 0.262 
Sales Growth 1.098 1.070 0.240 
S&P500 0.319 0.000 0.466 
Leverage 0.236 0.224 0.183 
Profit Margin 0.366 0.334 0.225 
Stock Illiquidity 0.086 0.043 0.158 
Liquid Assets 0.237 0.212 0.189 
Number of Deals 47.664 13.000 111.666 
No Deals 0.287 0.000 0.452 
Industry Sales 
Share 
0.032 0.008 0.061 
Institutional 
Holdings 
0.675 0.708 0.232 
Past 3yr Return 0.114 0.059 0.536 
 
